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The Eﬀect of Pay-When-Needed
Beneﬁt Guarantees on the Impact
of Social Security Privatization
Kent Smetters
3.1 Introduction
Many plans to privatize the mostly unfunded U.S. social security
deﬁned-beneﬁt program implicitly contain unfunded obligations of their
own in the form of beneﬁt guarantees. One example is the promise that
the assets in the new private accounts will produce an annuitized retire-
ment beneﬁt at least equal to what the participant would have received
under social security. The recent proposal by Senator Phil Gramm (1998),
for example, would guarantee that workers receive an annuitized beneﬁt
equal to 100 percent of what they would have received under social secu-
rity plus 20 percent of the value of the investment they build up “over
their working lives.” Unless the government reneges on this promise, fu-
ture workers would have to be taxed on a pay-when-needed basis to make
up for shortfalls. A minimum-beneﬁt guarantee, therefore, represents an
unfunded obligation that must be priced since money is not set aside
ahead of time to cover the associated actuarial burden.
This paper uses a simpliﬁed version of the model presented in Smetters
(1998) to report that large pay-when-needed minimum-beneﬁt guarantees
can be very costly, so costly that they can undermine and possibly reverse
the salutary economic eﬀects traditionally associated with privatization.
If payroll taxes were increased over time (from 12.4 to 18.75 percent) to
satisfy present-law beneﬁts, privatization would reduce unfunded liabilities
by more than a third only if the government guaranteed a beneﬁt level
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91below that currently provided by social security. This is true even though
the expected privatized beneﬁt is as much as ﬁve times as large as the
beneﬁt provided under social security. The reduction in unfunded liabili-
ties is small even at a high contribution rate because the returns to all the
dollars in the private account are perfectly correlated. To be sure, investing
more dollars reduces the work that each dollar must do in order for the
sum of dollars in the account at retirement to exceed the minimum-beneﬁt
guarantee. But the government must insure more dollars at a high contri-
bution rate. So each dollar is being insured less, but more dollars are being
insured, with only a small net eﬀect on unfunded liabilities. The net liabil-
ity decreases very little because insurance against very low equity returns
is extremely valuable; the guaranteed value, therefore, decreases slowly in
the total number of dollars invested. An alternative to a small pay-when-
needed guarantee is to prefund it with a tax from current workers to future
workers, which transfers resources in the opposite direction as standard
pay-as-you-go ﬁnancing.
3.1.1 Two Percent Accounts
To be sure, the high average historical real rate of return to equities
makes replacing social security with private accounts seem almost pain-
less. To maintain present-law beneﬁts, social security taxes would even-
tually have to increase to 18.75 percent of payroll, up from 12.4 percent
today. Privatizers argue that a small tax would suﬃce if it were invested in
equities. This tax could be as low as 2 percent of payroll—the popular “2
percent accounts.”1 The only cost of this reform would be that some work-
ers would have to pay the 2 percent tax on top of the payroll tax. But, in
return, future workers will be helped by the smaller overall tax.
The expected small tax rate in a new privatized system is due to what
Paul Samuelson once referred to as the “eighth wonder of the world”:
compound interest. Small diﬀerences in annual rates of return between
competing saving vehicles add up to big money over many years. The in-
trinsic average rate of return to a mature social security system like ours
equals the growth rate of the payroll-tax base. This is because payroll taxes
are not invested in capital but instead mostly paid out immediately as
beneﬁts (so-called pay-as-you-go ﬁnancing). This growth rate has aver-
aged about 2 percent per year after inﬂation since the early 1970s and is
expected to average closer to 1.1 percent per year in the future. Some an-
alysts use an average return to stocks of about 9 percent, which includes
roughly 7 percent return to equities and about 2 percent from taxes paid
by corporations. Over a thirty-year saving horizon, typical for the average
worker, $2 invested at 9 percent will return about the same ﬁnal beneﬁt as
$18.75 invested at 1.1 percent.
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1. The “2 percent” accounts were popularized by Feldstein and Samwick (1997) and have
been examined as well in Shipman (1998).But most of the tax saving that appears to come from equity investment
comes from attempting to exploit the historical wedge between Treasury
bonds and equities—the “equity premium.” Empirically, private investors
have demanded a considerable premium to accept risky investments. The
return to equities above U.S. government bonds during the past century
has averaged an astronomical six hundred basis points. Traditionally, this
premium has been regarded as compensation for risk. Subtracting this
premium from the 9 percent private market return substantially reduces
the power of compound interest. At a 3 percent real annual return, the
replacement-tax rate would increase from 2 to 12 percent.
To be sure, the equity premium has been a puzzle because it is higher
than can be explained by compensation for risk inside the standard neo-
classical inﬁnite-horizon model with isoelastic utility.2 The fact that the
equity premium is a puzzle, however, does not mean that it represents
“found money.” The government can exploit the premium only if the gov-
ernment somehow improves market eﬃciency. If the government fails to
improve the functioning of markets, then the equity-premium puzzle
simply reﬂects the ignorance of economists regarding their understanding
of attitudes toward risk. The puzzle does not present a costless exploit-
able opportunity.
3.1.2 The Risk in Stocks over Long Periods
Privatizing social security would subject a greater amount of retirement
saving to market risk by moving to a system of personal accounts invested
in the capital market. Equity risk is no small matter even over long hori-
zons. Indeed, there have been ﬁfteen years in this century alone in which
the real value of the U.S. stock market fell over 40 percent in the succeed-
ing decade.3 Moreover, some economists believe that the market might
fall another 40 percent or more during the next ten years owing to mean
reversion.4
While it is sometimes believed that stocks have little risk over the “long
run,” this view is not shared by many ﬁnance economists.5 Jagannathan
and Kocherlakota (1996), for example, have shown that, even for a forty-
year holding period in which stocks outperform bonds with almost 100
percent certainty, the optimal portfolio consists of 60 percent bonds and
40 percent stocks for a person with a reasonable aversion to risk.
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2. Mehra and Prescott (1985). Kocherlakota (1996) provides an excellent literature review.
3. These include 1908–12, 1937, 1939, 1965–66, and 1968–73. Not all drops, however, have
been sudden. The stock market declined by about 50 percent in real value between 1973 and
1975 and did not return to its pre-1973 level for almost ten years. Shiller (1996) provides an
overview of market risk.
4. Campbell and Shiller (1998) argue that, contrary to the eﬃcient market hypothesis, the
price-dividend ratio is a powerful predictor of future prices. They predict a 38 percent loss
in the real value of stocks over the next decade.
5. See, e.g., Bodie’s (1995) extensive examination of the long-run risks associated with
stocks.The large long-run averages in the United States may be misleading for
other reasons as well. First, while the U.S. market has performed well dur-
ing the past century, the same has not been true for major foreign markets,
which have rendered an average return of only 1.5 percent after inﬂation
(Goetzmann and Jorion 1996). Various social security reforms might ne-
cessitate investments abroad in order to diversify across a larger capital
base. Second, calculations that assume a 9 percent real return to equities
also ignore the portfolio substitutions that would occur as people might
reduce their other holdings of risky assets. These portfolio shifts would
tend to reduce both the capital income-tax revenue received by the govern-
ment and the returns that agents would receive in the rest of their portfo-
lio. Third, using a ﬁxed rate also ignores the fact that a larger capital stock
would tend to lower interest rates.
3.1.3 Analysis of Guarantees
At least two approaches have been used to evaluate minimum-beneﬁt
guarantees in the context of social security. One method, which I will
loosely call the likelihood method, uses Monte Carlo simulation based on
the historical experience of bonds and equities to predict the likelihood
that the assets in the new private accounts fail to replace the beneﬁt pro-
vided under social security (Hieger and Shipman 1997; Feldstein, Ran-
guelova, and Samwick, chap. 2 in this volume). The second method uses
arbitrage-pricing theory and assumes that the observable price covari-
ances reﬂect underlying preferences (Smetters 1998).6 Both approaches
assume similar price moments based on similar historical data. And both
approaches report marginal calculations by assuming ﬁxed price mo-
ments; that is, they correspond to privatizing a single dollar’s worth of
social security beneﬁts.
Despite their commonalities, the two approaches can paint strikingly
diﬀerent pictures of the cost of the beneﬁt guarantees. Although the likeli-
hood method does not explicitly calculate the price of a beneﬁt guarantee,
it often suggests little cost.7 For example, Hieger and Shipman argue that,
for a contribution rate at today’s level, the new private accounts will fail
to replace the beneﬁt level provided under social security with only a very
small probability. They do not, however, consider the transition from pay-
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6. Bodie (chap. 8 in this volume) and Marcus (1987) have examined guarantees in related
settings. Merton (1998) provides an extensive review of the use of option pricing in evaluat-
ing guarantees and numerous other policies.
7. An important exception is Bodie and Crane (1998), which considers a hypothetical
worker who retires at age sixty-ﬁve, earned $50,000 in the ﬁnal year of employment, and has
an asset target of $446,000 at age sixty-ﬁve to provide a twenty-year stream of $30,000 on a
real basis. Bodie and Crane show that, although new ﬁnancial products can play an impor-
tant role as investment alternatives in deﬁned-contribution plans, a nontrivial amount of risk
still remains. In particular, over 10 percent of the population fails to meet the target. For the
importance of risk over long horizons, see also Bodie (1995).as-you-go ﬁnancing to funding. Feldstein, Ranguelova, and Samwick
(chap. 2 in this volume) consider the transition, and their analysis recog-
nizes that the historical data represent draws from an underlying distribu-
tion that can include shocks not yet observed. They show that using a
contribution rate less than half of today’s value will, with a very high prob-
ability, lead to beneﬁts that exceed those provided under social security.
In sharp contrast, arbitrage pricing suggests that the unfunded guaran-
tee to replace social security beneﬁts is quite costly. Replacing one un-
funded pay-as-you-go beneﬁt with a pay-as-you-go guarantee can lead to
only a small net reduction in unfunded liabilities and possibly even an in-
crease (Smetters 1998; see below). Indeed, replacing a ﬁxed deﬁned beneﬁt
with a minimum beneﬁt of the same value is in eﬀect a beneﬁt increase.
Both methods give correct but diﬀerent information. The likelihood
method stresses the modest amount of large persistent shocks in the his-
torical data. By utility adjusting these loss probabilities, the arbitrage ap-
proach stresses the high aversion, as reﬂected in observable price mo-
ments, to the infrequent but large shocks, including potential shocks that
have yet to be observed.
3.1.4 Limits of the Present Analysis
This paper estimates the reduction in unfunded liabilities following pri-
vatization in the presence of a beneﬁt guarantee. In doing so, it makes
several assumptions that, on being relaxed, could lead to diﬀerent results.
I am relaxing several of these assumptions in work in progress. The com-
putations reported here, like those of any stylized model, should be viewed
with caution.
Complete Markets
One key assumption made in this paper is that the actuarial beneﬁt of
a minimum beneﬁt to generation t is equal to the actuarial cost imposed
on generation t  1. Option pricing, pioneered by Black and Scholes
(1973) and Merton (1973), is used to calculate the value of the beneﬁt
guarantee. (A general formulation of arbitrage pricing is given in Ross
[1976].) This allows for calculating the value of a guarantee without re-
sorting to approximations. Option-pricing technology also takes risk into
account instead of focusing on mean paths. The calculations presented
here correspond to what is commonly known as the complete markets
benchmark, which precludes any possible arbitrage possibility on the part
of the government.
In reality, markets are, of course, incomplete in numerous ways. One
source of market incompleteness stems from the legal prohibition of leav-
ing negative bequests to future generations. This legal constraint prevents
generation t private agents from negotiating risk-sharing deals on the be-
The Eﬀect of Pay-When-Needed Beneﬁt Guarantees 95half of future generation t  1 agents. The government can overcome this
limitation by precommitting future generations.8
The actuarial value of a beneﬁt guarantee to one generation might,
therefore, be less than or greater than the actuarial cost to the next genera-
tion once incomplete markets are taken into account.9 The exact answer
depends, in part, on the correlation of stock returns to generation t with
the wages of generation t  1. A tax on generation t  1 is more costly to
them if their wages decline at the same time. The standard assumption is
that productivity is the only source of uncertainty, which, in turn, implies
perfect correlation. In this case, the methodology used in this paper gener-
ally underprices the cost of the minimum-beneﬁt guarantee to generation
t  1, so the already high cost of guarantees estimated here is understated.
Allowing for enough imperfect correlation can shift the calculations in the
other direction. Empirically, wages and stock returns appear to be highly
correlated at generational frequencies. But the lack of unique long-run
period averages implies that the conﬁdence interval includes virtually all
values between zero correlation and perfect correlation. The approach
taken here, therefore, seems like a useful benchmark, at least until more
centuries of data become available.
Marginal Analysis
All computations ignore general equilibrium eﬀects on prices and,
therefore, correspond to only a small move toward privatization. In partic-
ular, the paper reports the change in unfunded liabilities associated with
privatizing a single dollar’s worth of social security beneﬁt. The property
of risk aversion implies that the marginal cost of guarantee to generation
t  1 increases with the absolute size of the guarantee. The focus on mar-
ginal analysis, therefore, leads to an underestimate of the cost of the guar-
antee per dollar guaranteed.
Moral Hazard
The paper ignores two moral hazard issues that could lead to more
expensive guarantees. First, it assumes that equity investment is restricted
to a broad index, such as the S&P500. Allowing for more choice would
tend to increase the cost of a minimum-beneﬁt guarantee because those
whose beneﬁt is near the guarantee level would have the incentive to “go
for broke.” The paper also assumes that private accounts are “locked
boxed” until retirement. Allowing for some early withdrawals, perhaps
during a recession, could increase the cost of the guarantee.
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8. This issue has been examined in the context of social security by Merton (1983) and
Bohn (1998).
9. Even if the government can create wealth by completing a missing market, arbitrage
pricing still gives the opportunity cost of using found money for a particular purpose. Found
money can be spent numerous ways in a world with highly substitutable policy instruments.Imputed Option Prices
Because options for broad stock indices are not available with genera-
tional frequency maturity dates, the analysis presented here imputes the
cost of option prices using the Black-Scholes option-pricing formula. This
approach might underprice the cost of a guarantee since the options on
broad indices that are traded are generally more expensive than the Black-
Scholes formula predicts given the variance of historical returns.
Political Uncertainty and Information
This paper ignores political uncertainty and information issues. Both
these issues are likely to be considerably important. And both challenge
the basic assumption inside the D.C. Beltway that contends that any viable
move toward personalized accounts must incorporate a minimum beneﬁt
equal to what people would have received under social security.
Most Latin American countries, with the exception of Mexico, promise
a minimum beneﬁt that is smaller, as a fraction of average preretirement
income, than the average beneﬁt provided by the U.S. social security sys-
tem. The minimum beneﬁt in the much-touted Chilean reform, for ex-
ample, equals only about 25 percent of average wages (Diamond and
Valde ´s-Prieto 1994). Mitchell and Barreto (1997) show that these plans
are quite popular and that this popularity has less to do with economics
than with perception and politics. This popularity includes seeing money
accumulate in one’s own individual account and out of the hands of the
government. Americans might be diﬀerent than Chileans in both person-
ality and history. But few Americans view their future social security bene-
ﬁts free from political uncertainty either. To the extent that this political
uncertainty inﬂates people’s discount rate, privatization can exploit a gen-
uine arbitrage possibility, provided that policy makers do not, in turn,
create signiﬁcant uncertainty about how the new private accounts are
taxed.
Privatization can also alter perceived net tax rates. The net social secu-
rity tax rate for the main household earner is generally less than the statu-
tory rate because the additional tax paid with an extra dollar of wages
corresponds to an increase in future beneﬁts. Social security commingles
old-age insurance and redistribution, which makes calculating net tax
rates diﬃcult, thereby distorting labor supply. Reducing this complexity
could result in sizable improvements to economic eﬃciency and welfare.
3.2 Pricing a Minimum-Beneﬁt Guarantee
This section outlines the model used and the stylized privatization re-
form. Both the stylized reform and the model are similar in spirit to those
analyzed in the important work of Feldstein and Samwick (1997) and of
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tion toward privatization is accomplished with a simple add-on tax. Fol-
lowing their lead, the model presented here assumes that stocks are risky
but that wages and the return to social security are not.10
3.2.1 Model
Life-cycle agents live for two periods, and their lifetime utility is given by
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where Cj,t is the consumption in year j by the generation t agent, and  is
the discount factor. The generation t agent earns a labor income equal to
Y1 at age 1, consumes C1,t at age 1, and saves the diﬀerence in either equi-
ties that pay a risky rate of return equal to et during period t or a risk-free
bond that pays r. It is assumed that the stock process can be described by
an Ito ¯-type stochastic diﬀerential equation and, without loss in generality,
has a stationary expected yield e  E(et | t). The individual faces a social
security payroll tax equal to 
, the proceeds of which are invested in a pay-
as-you-go social security asset that pays a rate of return equal to g.T h e
individual in period 2, therefore, has realized assets equal to
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where  (0 1) is the share of private assets invested in bonds, and
(1) is the share of assets invested in equities. Time subscripts for these
portfolio-share variables are omitted. The ﬁrst-order conditions are
standard:
(3) ′ =+ ′ UC rE UC t tt t () ( ) [ () | ] , ,, 12 1 
(4) ′ =+ ′ UC E eUC t tt t ( ) [( ) ( )| ]. ,, 12 1 
Note that, for linear utility (risk neutrality), these equations imply r  e
 E(et | t), that is, that the expected rate of return to equities equals the
risk-free rate. Risk aversion, however, implies that r  e, so it is not valid
to compare these instruments on the basis of their expected payoﬀs.
3.2.2 Privatization Proposal
Privatization begins at time t  1. Generation 0 agents, the current el-
derly, receive beneﬁts under the current pay-as-you-go social security sys-
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10. Smetters (1998) investigates the cost of guarantees in the presence of productivity
shocks that aﬀect wages, returns to capital, and returns to wage-indexed social security. Pri-
vatization tends to lead to even smaller reductions in unfunded liabilities in this context.tem. These beneﬁts are paid for by generation 1 agents—new workers—
who, in turn, receive nothing from social security. Instead, they face an











which is used to ﬁnance the new privatized beneﬁt. By construction, the
beneﬁt in the new private account, when invested in stocks, yields an ex-
pected beneﬁt equal to  times the beneﬁt provided under social security.
I consider 1 here since no major privatization plan considers other-
wise. The actual beneﬁt can take any positive value greater than zero
(owing to limited liability).
I assume that the government will wish to guarantee that a new account
will replace some fraction  of the beneﬁt that an agent would have re-
ceived under social security. A value of 1 means that the new account
yields a beneﬁt at least equal to what an agent would receive under social
security. This is a common benchmark. Some proposals to privatize the
U.S. system, however, contemplate even more generous guarantees (
1), so I will consider those values and smaller values.
Guarantees are ﬁnanced on a pay-when-needed basis. Generation t 
2, therefore, bears the actuarial cost of the beneﬁt guarantee given to gen-
eration t  1. Generations t  2 do not face the social security payroll tax
but instead face only the payroll tax 
N. Each generation receives a mini-
mum-beneﬁt guarantee from the next generation ﬁnanced on a pay-when-
needed basis. The eﬀect of privatization on the resources of each genera-
tion is outlined in Smetters (1998).
3.2.3 Estimates of Guarantee Cost
The government ﬁnances the guaranteed minimum beneﬁt on a pay-as-
you-go basis using payroll taxes. In Smetters (1998), I show that this ﬁscal
policy is mathematically equivalent to an intergenerational transfer of put
stock options, ﬁnanced on a pay-as-you-go basis, that guarantee that these
accounts produce the desired minimum beneﬁt.11 The corresponding re-
duction in the ex ante value of unfunded liabilities in stochastic steady
state (which incorporates changes in liabilities in the transition) for the
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11. In the more complicated model considered by Smetters (1998), the strike price of the
relevant option is wage indexed since the minimum beneﬁt is tied to what a person would
have received under social security (which is waged indexed). That paper also considered the
case in which the guarantee is not waged indexed since, in reality, most countries that have
implemented privatization have not waged indexed the beneﬁt guarantee.The variable  ˆ is the price of a one-period put option on a dollar’s worth
of equities with a strike price of $1[(/)( 1 e)] next period. This strike
price has a very intuitive interpretation. A higher expected-beneﬁt level
(), generated by a higher contribution rate 
N, lowers the implicit strike
price provided that the guarantee level is not also increased. This is be-
cause more dollars are being contributed to the private accounts, and
therefore each dollar need not perform as well for the same minimum-
beneﬁt guarantee to be satisﬁed. Similarly, a higher guarantee level () ef-
fectively “raises the bar” and requires each dollar to perform better, which,
in turn, increases the implicit strike price. The term (1  r)/(1  e) ef-
fectively subtracts any attempt to arbitrage between the risk-free rate and
the average return to equities.
The parameters in equation (6) are directly observable or can be com-
puted using observable prices. The value of the put option can be priced
exactly without any additional assumptions about the preferences beyond
nonsatiation using the popular Black-Scholes (1973) option-pricing theo-
rem. This is because the underlying price moments are assumed to fully
incorporate all relevant information about preferences.
Table 3.1 reports values corresponding to equation (6) for various pa-
rameter choices. Following Feldstein and Samwick (1997), the annual av-
erage risk-free rate (r) is set equal to 2 percent, and the economy’s ex-
pected growth rate, g, is set equal to 1.1 percent per year. Bonds, therefore,
are assumed to stochastically dominate social security. Privatization is
compared against a solvent social security system’s current-law beneﬁts.
This requires eventually increasing the payroll-tax rate to 18.75 percent. I
also consider Feldstein and Samwick’s choice of the average annual return
to equities equal to 9 percent as one of the possible parameter values for
e. The standard deviation of the ﬁrst diﬀerences of logged real returns on
the S&P500 equals 0.20 since 1928 and 0.164 since 1949. I conservatively
chose 0.16 in all calculations. Each period is assumed to represent thirty
years, so the annual rates given above are converted to their thirty-year
equivalents in all calculations presented here.12
Notice from table 3.1 that privatization with a large minimum-beneﬁt
guarantee has diﬃculty reducing unfunded liabilities. Consider the bench-
mark case 1, in which the contribution rate to the new accounts is
chosen to produce an expected beneﬁt equal to the current social security
beneﬁt. This case was considered by Feldstein and Samwick (1997). The
model presented here closely replicates their “2 percent” contribution
level, which they showed could be used to fully replace social security in
the long run.13 Without a minimum-beneﬁt guarantee, privatization would
reduce the ex ante value of unfunded liabilities by 100 percent. Modifying
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12. The choice of thirty years follows the two-period illustrative calculations presented in
Feldstein and Samwick (1997).
13. Feldstein and Samwick were the ﬁrst to note how well the two-period framework is
able to produce tax rates that are comparable to their more elaborate multiperiod model.their analysis to include a minimum-beneﬁt guarantee, however, changes
things dramatically. If the current social security beneﬁt is guaranteed (
 1), unfunded liabilities are now reduced by only 13 percent. One should
not be surprised by this result. Using a payroll tax of only 2 percent to
replace a payroll tax of 18.75 percent places a large demand on the equity
premium that is unexploitable in the model presented here. Guaranteeing
that this equity premium will, in fact, materialize places a large unfunded
liability on future generations. Just how accurate is this calculation? Smet-
ters (1998) shows that, in the special case of 1, one can calculate
the reduction in unfunded liabilities using an alternative procedure that
does not rely on options pricing.14 The estimated reduction in unfunded
liabilities is almost identical for both methods.
14. The veriﬁcation is technically valid only for the two-sided bet scenario in which both
the downside risk and the excessive upside potential (i.e., returns in excess of expectation)
Table 3.1 New Contribution Rate for Private Account, N, Percentage Reduction in
Unfunded Liabilities with a Minimum Beneﬁt, Prefunding Tax Necessary to
Eliminate Remaining Unfunded Liabilities, F: Expected Retirement Income Equal
to  Times Social Security Coverage, Minimum Guaranteed Beneﬁt Equal to 
Times Social Security Coverage, and Expected Return to Equities Equal to e
Exogenous
Percent Reduction Value of Put Option, Parameters
New Payroll Prefunding in Unfunded  ˆ , per Dollar
 e Tax Rate, 
N Liabilities Tax, 
F Contribution ($)
1 1.00 .07 .0342 21.1 .1135 3.32
1 1.00 .09 .0196 13.2 .1248 6.36
2 1.00 .07 .0684 31.6 .0983 1.44
2 1.00 .09 .0392 23.3 .1103 2.81
2 1.25 .07 .0684 10.7 .1284 1.88
2 1.25 .09 .0392 0.4 .1442 3.68
3 1.00 .07 .1026 35.4 .0928 .90
3 1.00 .09 .0589 29.6 .1012 1.72
3 1.25 .07 .1026 17.1 .1191 1.16
3 1.25 .09 .0589 7.7 .1326 2.25
3 1.50 .07 .1026 2.5 .1474 1.44
3 1.50 .09 .0589 15.1 .1654 2.81
5 1.00 .07 .1710 36.4 .0914 .53
5 1.00 .09 .0981 35.1 .0933 .95
5 1.50 .07 .1710 3.9 .1381 .81
5 1.50 .09 .0981 3.4 .1486 1.51
5 2.00 .07 .1710 31.9 .1896 1.11
5 2.00 .09 .0981 46.3 .2102 2.14
Note: Risk-free rate, r, equals 0.02. Growth rate of tax base, g, equals 0.011. Social security tax rate, 
,
equals 0.1875. Length of each period equals 30 years.
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ad i ﬃcult time reducing unfunded liabilities. Consider, for example, 
3, where the expected private beneﬁt is three times the social security bene-
ﬁt. The contribution level equals 6 percent of payroll, but unfunded liabili-
ties are reduced by only 30 percent at 1. For 5, the contribution
level is about 10 percent, but the reduction in unfunded liabilities is only
35 percent. Even at 8 (not shown), privatization reduces unfunded
liabilities by only 36 percent even though the contribution rate is now
almost 16 percent. A higher contribution level reduces how well each con-
tributed dollar must perform in order for the sum of dollars in a private
account to satisfy the minimum beneﬁt. This is shown by the smaller value
of  ˆ in table 3.1 associated with higher contribution rates. A higher contri-
bution level, however, requires insuring a larger number of dollars. The net
eﬀect on unfunded liabilities associated with increasing the contribution
level is minimal. So, for example, at 1, the price of the implicit
put option per dollar of contribution equals $6.36 with a strike of $13.27.
Increasing the contribution level by ﬁve times (so that 5) reduces the
value of the put option to only $0.95 since the strike price is now only
$2.65 (i.e., one-ﬁfth of $13.27). So the sheer number of dollars being in-
sured is now ﬁve times greater than before, but the value of the put option
per invested dollar decreases by only six and a half times, resulting in only
a small net decrease in the unfunded liability.
Note that the “oversaving strategy” associated with high contribution
levels is not the same thing as diversiﬁcation. Diversiﬁcation is a powerful
risk-management technique because it pools assets whose returns are not
perfectly correlated. In sharp contrast, a larger contribution level simply
throws in more dollars, and the return to each additional dollar is perfectly
correlated with the last dollar contributed. The fundamental problem with
the oversaving strategy is that it fails to make the intergenerational side
payments that are necessary to signiﬁcantly reduce unfunded obligations.
In Smetters (1998), I show that these side payments are an automatic fea-
ture of prefunding a deﬁned-beneﬁt system. Since the current paper, how-
ever, is about privatization, I consider an alternative technique, which I
call a prefunding guarantee tax.
Table 3.1 shows the value of a hypothetical prefunding tax from current
















are passed to future generations. This would be the case if, e.g., the government were at-
tempting to prefund the current deﬁned-beneﬁt system. The veriﬁcation works very well in
this case. Moreover, for the one-sided bet with 1, the ex ante value of the unfunded
liabilities passed to future generations is very close to the value for the two-sided bet. The
reason is that the upside potential has very little value in this case.This tax would have to be used to increase public saving (i.e., instead of
spending it elsewhere). In practice, this tax could be used to reduce the
level of baseline debt or, for example, other pay-as-you-go liabilities asso-
ciated with Medicare; a surplus would have to be invested in the capital
market. Equation (7) has a straightforward interpretation: it says that full
self-insurance requires current workers to purchase a put option them-
selves for each dollar that they invest in their new accounts via the new
payroll tax, 
N. Anything less would pass some insurance cost to future
generations, who, by assumption, cannot credibly commit to provide a
minimum beneﬁt less than  times current social security coverage. A tax
equal to 
F, therefore, eliminates all remaining unfunded liabilities after
privatization.
Table 3.1 shows that, for the policy parameters {, }, a total tax rate
(
N 
 F) of 14.5 percent is needed to fully eliminate all unfunded liabili-
ties. The total tax rate for the policy parameters {, }  {5, 1} is over 19
percent. The reason for the large diﬀerence is that, in the case {, } 
{1, 1}, the size of the guarantee funding tax, 
F, equals 12.5 percent, which
is larger than the 9.3 percent tax for {, }  {5, 1}. Because more revenue
is transferred to future generations in the case {, }  {1, 1}, it requires
a smaller overall tax rate to fully eliminate all unfunded liabilities.
Table 3.2 shows the eﬀects of reducing the guarantee level to 75 percent
of the beneﬁt provided by social security. Consider the case {, }  {1,
0.75}. Whereas privatization reduced unfunded liabilities by only 13 per-
cent with a 100 percent guarantee, it now reduces unfunded liabilities by
Table 3.2 New Contribution Rate for Private Account, N, Percentage Reduction in
Unfunded Liabilities with a Minimum Beneﬁt, Prefunding Tax Necessary to
Eliminate Remaining Unfunded Liabilities, F: Expected Retirement Income Equal
to  Times Social Security Coverage, Minimum Guaranteed Beneﬁt Equal to 0.75
Times Social Security Coverage, and Expected Return to Equities Equal to e
Exogenous
Value of Put Option, Percent Reduction Parameters
New Payroll in Unfunded Prefunding  ˆ , per Dollar
 e Tax Rate, 
N Liabilities Tax, 
F Contribution ($)
1 .75 .07 .0342 44.3 .0801 2.34
1 .75 .09 .0196 37.7 .0895 4.56
2 .75 .07 .0684 51.0 .0705 1.03
2 .75 .09 .0392 45.9 .0778 1.98
3 .75 .07 .1026 52.3 .0686 .67
3 .75 .09 .0589 49.9 .0720 1.22
5 .75 .07 .1710 52.3 .0686 .40
5 .75 .09 .0981 52.2 .0687 .70
Note: Risk-free rate, r, equals 0.02. Growth rate of tax base, g, equals 0.011. Social security tax rate, 
,
equals 0.1875. Length of each period equals 30 years.
The Eﬀect of Pay-When-Needed Beneﬁt Guarantees 10338 percent with a 2 percent contribution level. Including a funding tax of
9 percent, for a total of 11 percent, fully eliminates all unfunded liabilities.
3.3 Conclusion
This paper shows that high guarantees can be quite costly. But it would
be wrong to interpret these results as suggesting that a move toward per-
sonalized accounts must be a bad idea. This paper is about pay-when-
needed guarantees. Although pay-when-needed guarantees appear to be
cheap because they cost nothing up front, they can be quite costly from a
risk-adjusted perspective. The balancing act facing privatizers is to select
a modest guarantee level that is also credible over time. Alternatively, pri-
vatization could be accompanied with a generous guarantee that is pre-
funded with a prefunding tax from current workers to future workers.
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Comment David W. Wilcox
A number of plans for the privatization of social security propose to guar-
antee that beneﬁciaries receive a speciﬁed minimum amount irrespective
of how ﬁnancial markets may perform. A guarantee of this type transfers
to the government part of the risk associated with uncertain future rates
of return. This ﬁne paper by Kent Smetters notes that such a guarantee
generally represents an unfunded liability of the new system and argues
that this liability may be very large—indeed, possibly nearly as large as
the unfunded liability associated with the current system.
The central result in Smetter’s paper runs as follows: if beneﬁciaries are
guaranteed at least their current-law beneﬁt, and if the payroll-tax rate is
set so as to generate the current-law beneﬁt assuming that stocks yield 9
percent year in and year out, then the unfunded liability associated with
the beneﬁt guarantee is about 87 percent as large as the unfunded liability
in the current system. Moreover, a strategy of “oversaving” turns out to
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of the Treasury Department.be relatively ineﬀective in reducing the unfunded liability associated with
the beneﬁt guarantee: even if the payroll tax rate is set at ﬁve times the level
required to generate the current-law beneﬁt in expectation, the unfunded
liability associated with the beneﬁt guarantee is still 65 percent as large as
the unfunded liability in the current system.
In chapter 2 in this volume, Feldstein, Ranguelova, and Samwick (FRS)
also examine the potential cost of beneﬁt guarantees. They estimate that
the probability of the guarantee becoming binding could plausibly be de-
signed to be quite low. And, even in the event that the guarantee is binding,
they estimate that the cost in most cases would be relatively modest. Over-
all, FRS believe the ﬁnancial burden of beneﬁt guarantees to be manage-
able: “The remaining moderate level of retiree risk [of a beneﬁt that is
lower than under current law, taking into account the higher expected re-
turn on ﬁnancial assets] can be completely eliminated by a government
guarantee that can be provided with very little risk to taxpayers.”
It could be that both papers are correct. Smetters could be correct that
ﬁnancial markets would place a very high price on a beneﬁt guarantee of
the type he studies, possibly because the required payment in rare cases
would be very large, possibly because the circumstances in which the pay-
ment is required are precisely the circumstances in which taxpayers are
especially unhappy about providing it. FRS could simultaneously be cor-
rect that the government will need to make good on a well-designed bene-
ﬁt guarantee with only low probability and that the required payment will
in most cases be small.
Notwithstanding that both papers could be correct, they diﬀer in two
important respects. First, Smetters relies on the fundamental validity of
observed securities prices as reﬂections of informed decisions of rational
agents with sensible degrees of risk aversion, even if we economists cannot
write down a simple model that explains all aspects of these data. In par-
ticular, Smetters treats the equity premium as reﬂecting compensation for
risk and not as “a costless exploitable opportunity” for the government.
By contrast, FRS question the wisdom of grounding decisions about gov-
ernment policy in data that we cannot fully understand or explain, save
perhaps by appeal to an implausible assumption about the degree of risk
aversion in ﬁnancial markets. (In the context of a standard representative-
agent model with isoelastic utility, the observed equity premium can be
explained only by assuming an implausibly large coeﬃc i e n to fr e l a t i v e
risk aversion.)
A second important dimension along which the two papers diﬀer is the
metric they use to assess the cost of a guarantee. FRS adopt a frequentist
perspective (Smetters calls it the likelihood approach) and provide infor-
mation about tail probabilities and the shape of distributions associated
with investment outcomes. By contrast, Smetters views the issue through
the prism of ﬁnancial market prices that should embed all the FRS infor-
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about preferences and covariances with consumption.
In principle, there is no inherent conﬂict between these two approaches;
they simply provide diﬀerent information about the same question. Smet-
ters evaluates the cost of a beneﬁt guarantee at market prices. Presumably,
this is a useful approach if one believes that government policies should
be evaluated assuming that the price of risk is the same to the government
as it is to private transactors in ﬁnancial markets. By contrast, FRS pro-
vide some of the raw material that one would need to assemble in order
to evaluate the cost of a beneﬁt guarantee under the assumption that the
government should be willing to transact as a risk-neutral agent.1 All other
diﬀerences between the two papers aside, one can obviously arrive at dif-
ferent conclusions about the desirability of a given policy depending on
the price one attaches to the ﬁnancial risk that may be involved in that
policy.
The issue of whether risk-related aspects of government policies should
be evaluated at market prices crops up in a surprising number of contexts
in the practical policy-making arena. Some of these instances arise out
of the budget “scorekeeping” process. By way of background, both the
Congressional Budget Oﬃce and the Oﬃce of Management and Budget
have important responsibilities in estimating the cost of legislative propos-
als moving through the Congress. The current state of the art in this area
is to assign, in eﬀect, a zero price to risk—or, to put it slightly diﬀerently,
to assume that the government operates as a risk-neutral agent.
A recent instance arises in the context of the student loan program.
Under current law, payments to lenders under this program are indexed to
the Treasury-bill rate. On a number of occasions, Congress has considered
proposals to shift the index to something more closely approximating the
cost of funds to lenders in this market—perhaps the commercial paper
rate or LIBOR. A move along these lines would reduce lenders’ so-called
basis risk (the risk associated with ﬂuctuations in the spread between their
borrowing and their lending rates). However, the government would take
on a similar risk because it would still be borrowing at the Treasury-bill
rate but would begin making payments indexed to some private-sector
rate. Current budgetary scorekeeping practice would take account of such
factors as average spreads between Treasury and private rates but would
eﬀectively assign a budgetary cost of zero to any basis risk assumed by the
government. Swap markets, on the other hand, take quite a diﬀerent view
of the price of risk.
A separate set of questions pertains to the plausibility of Smetters’s esti-
mates. Of necessity, his model is of course highly stylized. Which omitted
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probabilities and tail shapes.features might bias his estimate of the cost of a guarantee, and in which
direction? First, as Smetters notes, his model provides no discretion in
the choice of a portfolio—either within the realm of equity investments
(e.g., small cap vs. large cap) or in the larger design of the portfolio (e.g.,
whether to have any equity exposure at all). Even in the absence of moral
hazard, any ﬂexibility in portfolio choice will drive up the cost of a beneﬁt
guarantee (because the government would be left holding the downside of
any available choice while beneﬁciaries would reap the upside), so long as
the rates of return on the available alternatives are not perfectly correlated.
And moral hazard would drive up the cost still further.
Second, because the agents in Smetters’s model work only one period,
there is no heterogeneity in the timing of earnings. In the real world, two
workers who accumulate an identical entitlement to social security bene-
ﬁts may have quite diﬀerent proﬁles of earnings and hence may have expe-
rienced quite diﬀerent exposure to the stock market. Again, heterogeneity
of this type will tend to push up the cost of a guarantee.
Third, because the agents in Smetters’s model live only one period in
retirement, there is no need for annuitization. In the real world, the policy
process may choose to impose a requirement for annuitization in order to
protect beneﬁciaries from outliving their social security wealth. The rate
at which account balances are annuitized represents another source of
ﬁnancial risk, quite distinct from the pattern of equity returns, and hence
another source of upward push to the actual cost of a guarantee.
The paper by Smetters touches on fundamental issues in the debate
about social security reform. What makes that paper even more interesting
is the productive dialogue in which it engages with the work of FRS. The
social security reform process will be the beneﬁciary of this productive in-
terchange.
Discussion Summary
Stephen Ross wondered why the equity-risk premium enters the analysis,
given that it is being called an arbitrage-pricing approach. In particular, he
asked why the equity-risk premium plays any role in deciding what the
values of the current beneﬁts are under any alternative plan. Kent Smetters
responded that the experiments in this paper, as in others, are being done
by choosing a payroll tax such that the expected beneﬁt of the new system
is equal to the beneﬁt that would have been received under social security.
The equity-risk premium aﬀects the choice of the payroll tax. Put diﬀer-
ently, one is trying to exploit the wedge between e, the expected rate of
return on equities, and g, the return that social security would have given.
108 Kent SmettersEﬀectively, the results suggest that this wedge cannot be exploited in the
case of risk adjustment.
Ross concluded that using the term arbitrage in the context of the paper
might be misleading as the analysis does use a utility-based model. Debo-
rah Lucas concurred.
Robert King raised the issue that option prices generated by the Black-
Scholes formula are independent of the equity premium. Smetters replied
that, although the equity premium does not explicitly appear in the for-
mula, it does matter through the strike price chosen.
Martin Feldstein emphasized that this entire discussion is a very funda-
mental issue and encouraged subsequent discussions about the role of the
equity premium in the social security reform debate.
James Poterba inquired why Smetters did not consider looking at the
market price of long-term options on a broad index of stocks in order to
gauge the cost of obtaining a truncated distribution of returns, similar to
the one implicit in a beneﬁt guarantee. Depending on one’s view of the
Arrow-Lind theorem, an interesting alternative for using the tax system
to redistribute the risk of a shortfall is to have ﬁnancial market partici-
pants bear it. The issue at the core of the debate is which arrangement
bears this risk in the most eﬃcient way.
Zvi Bodie remarked that such options are traded only for maturities
up to three years. Longer-maturity instruments are available only over
the counter.
John Shoven noted that it could be argued that both Smetters and
Feldstein, Ranguelova, and Samwick probably set themselves too high a
goal in their papers as the current social security system does not provide
a beneﬁt guarantee either. He wondered whether it was not too ambitious
to try to replace the current system with one that is far superior in terms
of beneﬁt guarantees.
In a similar vein, Feldstein asked Smetters to point out what reduction
in unfunded liabilities would correspond to a scenario where the guarantee
() equals 75 percent rather than 100 percent. He noted that the results
across the rows in table 3.1 looked roughly linear and symmetrical and
wondered whether it was therefore correct to infer from rows 3 and 5 that
the reduction in unfunded liabilities would be in the 50 percent range for
 equal to 75 percent. Smetters conﬁrmed this.
With reference to Poterba’s question, Antonio Rangel remarked that,
even if the market were cheaper than the tax system in bearing the risk of a
shortfall, it would not yield full eﬃciency in an intergenerational context.
Henning Bohn noted that the pricing approach in this paper assumes
complete markets. This standard assumption might not be valid in the
context of the paper because future unborn generations, currently not ex-
posed to equity risk, might not assess the same price for the bailout of a
cohort in the event of a shortfall as the generation currently alive would.
The Eﬀect of Pay-When-Needed Beneﬁt Guarantees 109This issue relates to the potential imperfection in risk sharing from an ex
ante perspective in overlapping-generations models. The shadow value of
receiving a certain guarantee might be diﬀerent across diﬀerent cohorts.
Andrew Samwick asked Smetters to clarify the diﬀerence between his
setup and the one in the Feldstein, Ranguelova, and Samwick paper. In
particular, row 2 of table 3.1 shows a payroll tax 
N of around 2 percent
and a reverse pay-as-you-go tax 
R of 12.4 percent. Although these num-
bers are quite similar to some of the exercises reported in Feldstein, Ran-
guelova, and Samwick, the results are not. The discussant, David Wilcox,
pointed out that there is a third tax, not reported in the table, which is
the tax on the current generation to bear the unfunded liability of the
current system.
John Campbell stated that he wanted to follow up on Bohn’s remark.
Some models of the equity premium emphasize constraints faced by the
young. For instance, Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (1998) ex-
plain the equity premium by imposing borrowing constraints on the
young. They have a substantial amount of human capital and would like
to borrow to invest in equities, but they cannot. This rationalizes a high
equity premium. In that context, a government system that in eﬀect relaxes
the constraint by using the taxing power of the government would aﬀect
asset prices. This possibility is excluded by Smetters’s assumption of ﬁxed
market prices.
Smetters stated that the portfolio choice is restricted and that this ignores
potential sources of moral hazard. Not doing so would increase the un-
funded liabilities. Also, the focus of the paper is on a two-period model,
which eliminates some sources of risk, as Wilcox noted. Enriching the
model with either of these features would be an interesting extension.
With respect to Poterba’s remark, Smetters stated that he initially exam-
ined market data for two-year options on a broad stock index. He found
that these are overpriced by the market, according to the Black-Scholes
formula. Moreover, the Arrow-Lind theorem assumes orthogonality,
which is not the case in the model of the paper.
Smetters agreed with Shoven’s comment that the current system does
not completely commit to paying out the promised beneﬁts.
Regarding incomplete markets, Smetters made two points. First, it is
not obvious to tell from current models whether hedging is cheaper for
the government than for private agents in the case of incomplete markets.
Second, even if it were cheaper for the government so that there would be
some arbitrage surpluses, the costs in the paper are to be interpreted as
opportunity-cost calculations. In other words, if these surpluses did exist,
they could be used for other purposes as well.
Finally, Smetters agreed with Campbell that the introduction of fric-
110 Kent Smetterstions, for instance, borrowing constraints, would have important implica-
tions for this line of research.
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